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CHALLENGING REZONING IN VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Zoning is an intrusion into our everyday lives, regulating a right basic
to most Americans-the free use of their land. As municipalities increase
their use of the zoning mechanism, more landowners will find the use of
their lands restricted and in turn will seek legal counsel in order to chal-
lenge the restrictions. Presently, when faced with a rezoning question, a
practitioner has to filter through the many treatises, articles and cases in
an attempt to pull together Virginia law.1 It is the purpose of this com-
ment to compile Virginia rezoning law in order to serve as a reference for
the practitioner who is unfamiliar with this ever-developing body of law.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
The concept of zoning originated in early Roman times.2 Zoning in the
United States appears to have developed since 1692 when Massachusetts
began regulating gunpowder mills and slaughterhouses.3 One of the first
comprehensive zoning ordinances in the United States was enacted in
New York in 1916, and almost immediately similar regulations were
adopted by hundreds of municipalities.4
The United States Supreme Court first upheld the right of a municipal-
ity to enact a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1926.5 In Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co.,6 the Supreme Court found that the power to
zone is derived from the inherent police power of the state.7 The power to
zone, therefore, is a legislative power vested in the state which must be
delegated by the state to the local governments. 8 Since a municipality has
no inherent police power, its power to zone must be derived from statute.
In Virginia, this zoning enabling statute is title 15.1, section 86 of the
1. See generally Comment, Zoning, Planning and the Scope of Judicial Review in Vir-
ginia, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 497 (1976); Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning Practices, 10 U.
RICH. L. REv. 646 (1976); Note, Land Use Law in Virginia, 90 U. RICH. L. REV. 513 (1975).
2. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 1-3 (3d ed. 1965).
3. Solberg, "Rural Zoning in the United States" (Agric. Info. Bull. 59, USDA 1952).
4. 1 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.13 (2d ed. 1976).
5. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 390.
8. E.g., National Maritime Union v. City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 672, 119 S.E.2d 307 (1961).
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Virginia Code.9
Zoning is defined by the code as the division of the territory under the
jurisdiction of a governing body into districts in order to regulate (a) uses,
(b) structural dimensions, (c) the amount of land, water and air space to
be occupied, and (d) the use of the natural resources.' 0 When members of
a municipal council or county board of supervisors adopt a zoning ordi-
nance they are acting in a legislative capacity.1 As such, they enjoy abso-
lute immunity from personal suit when making zoning decisions.12 Their
motives in enacting the ordinance are also beyond the scope of judicial
review.' 3
The purpose of zoning is to promote the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the community; to protect and conserve the value of
buildings; and to encourage the most appropriate use of the land.14 Pro-
motion of this purpose involves a two-fold approach. First, zoning should
be designed to protect the present character of an area by excluding
"prejudicial uses."' 5 Second, zoning should provide for development of an
area in a manner consistent with the uses for which it is suited. e Zoning
ordinances are either exclusive, designating certain prohibited uses in a
particular district; or inclusive, specifying certain permissible uses and
excluding all others.17 Both types of zoning ordinances have been recog-
nized in Virginia.' 8
Rezoning is an amendment to present zoning which either increases the
number of allowable uses of the subject property (upzoning), or which
decreases the property's permissible uses (downzoning). Land is zoned by
ordinances passed by the legislative bodies of municipalities and counties.
The necessary and proper procedure for rezoning land is likewise by legis-
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
10. Id.
11. Shannon Fredericksburg Motor Inn, Inc. v. Hicks, 434 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va. 1977).
12. Id. at 805. Accord, Ligon v. State, 448 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1977).
13. Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 32 (1948).
14. City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958). See
also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
15. Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959) (court
failed to define "prejudicial use"; however such a use might be inferred from the present
Code to include one which overcrowds the land, causes undue density of population in rela-
tion to existing community facilities, or obstructs light or air). See VA. CODE ANN. 15.1-489
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
16. Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959).
17. Wiley v. County of Hanover, 209 Va. 153, 155, 163 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1968).
18. E.g., Fairfax County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947).
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lative ordinance. 9
I. REZONING METHODS
The Virginia Code provides that "[w]henever the public necessity, con-
venience, general welfare, or good zoning practices require, the governing
body may by ordinance, amend. . . the regulations, district boundaries,
or classifications of property."20 Amendment may be initiated by resolu-
tion of the governing body, by motion of the local planning commission,
or by petition of any property owner. 1 The governing body must refer all
amendments to the planning commission for its recommendations.22 Pub-
lic hearings must be held by both the governing body and the planning
commission prior to the enactment of zoning amendments.2 '
There are at least three methods the governing body may utilize in en-
acting a zoning amendihent.24 One method, usually associated with resi-
dential areas, is referred to as "lot zoning. 25 Residential or lot zones
generally specify the minimum lot size for each dwelling unit or the maxi-
mum number of units that may be accommodated within a certain area.
As the minimum lot size increases or decreases, the intensity of develop-
ment varies accordingly.
Amendment of the text of a zoning ordinance, a second method,
changes the allowable uses within a particular zone while leaving the use
classification unchanged.26 This method is exemplified by an amendment
reducing a maximum building height from 75 to 50 feet while leaving the
district zoned "commercial." This is a subtle, almost covert method of
rezoning.
The third and perhaps most common method of rezoning is to change
the allowable uses of a piece of property by changing its classification.27 A
19. See Board of Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1959); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-491(g) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(g) (Cur. Supp. 1980).
21. Id.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
23. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-431, -493 (Cur. Supp. 1980). Note that if land is to be zoned
to uses greater than were declared in the public notice required by § 15.1-431, § 15.1-493
requires that another public hearing must be held before the governing body may enact the
amendment. Note also that § 15.1-431 allows the planning commission and governing body
to hold one joint public hearing.
24. Linowes & Delaney, Downzoning-And How the Landowner May Fight It, 5 REAL
EST. L. J. 311, 312-14 (1977).
25. Id. at 312-13.
26. Id. at 313-14.
27. Id. at 314.
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downzoning amendment changing a subclassification from R-2 to R-1 is
an example of a classification change. Typically R-2, or Residential-2,
zones allow not only for single family residences but also for multi-family
dwellings such as townhouses and apartments. Changing the zoning to R-
1 would eliminate multi-family uses of the property and greatly reduce its
value to developers.
IV. CHALLENGING REZONING
There is no statutory right of appeal from the zoning decisions of a
municipal legislative body.2 8 There are, however, at least four ways rezon-
ing controversies may reach a Virginia court.2 9 First, an "aggrieved per-
son"30 may seek an injunction to prevent enforcement of a zoning ordi-
nance affecting his property.3 1 Second, a declaratory judgment may be
sought to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional.3 2 The third and
most frequently used method of obtaining judicial review of rezoning de-
cisions is to sue in equity for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
from the zoning ordinance.3 3 Finally, one may petition the circuit court of
the county or city for certiorari to review the administrative decision of
the board of zoning appeals," though one may be required to exhaust
one's administrative remedies prior to seeking any judicial relief.35
Those who have standing to challenge a zoning amendment may be di-
vided into two categories: the aggrieved landowner and any other "ag-
grieved third party."3 " Generally, in order to have standing in a zoning
28. Note, Land Use Law in Virginia, supra note 1, at 539.
29. Id. There are actually eight ways zoning challenges reach Virginia's courts. The re-
maining four (which are not applicable to rezoning contests) include: a writ of mandamus
ordering an official to issue a requested permit; an injunction to prevent the governing body
from granting a permit or variance; civil or criminal actions by the local governing bodies to
enforce zoning matters. Id.
30. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Standard Oil v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1930); McNair v.
Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 532, 186 S.E.2d 45 (1972); City of Alexandria v. Texaco Co., 172 Va.
209, 1 S.E.2d 296 (1939). See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-499 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
32. Note, Land Use Law in Virginia, supra note 1, at 539.
33. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 940 (1975). See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-184 to -191 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (Cunm. Supp. 1980).
35. See Gayton Triangle Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570
(1976) (landowner's rezoning challenge held improper for failure to first seek variance from
board of zoning appeals). Cf. Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 133 n.4, 216 S.E.2d
199, 205 n.4 (1975) (landowner challenging rezoning need not apply for variance before
bringing his declaratory judgment action if the challenged restrictions or obligations could
not be remedied by variance).
36. See Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. Rxv.
[Vol. 15:423
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matter, one must be specially, personally and adversely affected by the
governing body's actions, as distinguished from a party who is affected in
a general way.37 A landowner has a definite legal interest in the use of his
land and is always accorded the status of an "aggrieved person."38 How-
ever, in order for a third party to qualify as an "aggrieved person," he
must be able to prove some special damages not shared with other land-
owners in the same general vicinity.39 For example, it has been held that a
landowner whose property adjoins land directly affected by a zoning
change has an interest sufficient to give him standing.40 Logically, the less
distance between a third party's land and the land which is the subject of
the ordinance, the more likely the third party will be deemed to have
standing to challenge the ordinance. 1
Regardless of the method chosen to attack a zoning amendment, the
challenge will usually be based upon two legal arguments. First, it may be
claimed that the zoning amendment is invalid because it is an improper
exercise of police power. Second, the challenger may argue that the zon-
ing ordinance is unconstitutional. 2
294 (1967).
37. See generally Knowlton v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 220 Va. 571, 260 S.E.2d 232
(1979); County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947); Goreib v. Fox, 145 Va.
554, 134 S.E. 914, af'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1926).
38. Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, supra note 36, at 296-97.
39. Id. at 306. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 157 S.E.2d 920 (1967) (standing
of third parties challenging rezoning not made an issue).
40. Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, supra note 36, at 303. See,
e.g., Snyder v. City Council, 35 Colo. App. 32, 531 P.2d 643 (1974); Tazza v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 164 Conn. 187, 319 A.2d 393 (1972); Hubert v. Zoning Board, 158 Conn.
187, 257 A.2d 810 (1969); Whittingham v. Village of Woodbridge, 111 Ill. App. 2d 147, 249
N.E.2d 332 (1969); Allen v. Cowel, 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. App. 1972). But cf. Unitarian
Church v. Shorten, 64 Misc. 2d 1027, 316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1970) (abutting property owners not
entitled to standing absent showing of economic loss).
41. Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, supra note 36, at 304. See,
e.g., Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 265 A.2d 885 (1970) (person with property
boundary within 200-500 feet held to have standing); White v. Major Realty, Inc., 251 Md.
63, 246 A.2d 249 (1968) (owners with property one-half mile away held to lack standing);
Leroux v. Baltimore, 248 Md. 106, 234 A.2d 747 (1967) (owners and property within same
block held to have standing); Wilkinson v. Atkinson, 242 Md. 231, 218 A.2d 503 (1966)
(owners of property across boulevard held to have no standing); Duddles v. City Council, 21
Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d 583 (1975) (property owners within sight or sound may have stand-
ing). But see Mueller v. Anderson, 60 Misc. 2d 568, 303 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1969) (distance of
property owner from subject property irrelevant if within "immediate vicinity" of subject).
42. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 316.
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A. Police Power Theories
The multi-faceted police power test has its origins in the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 4' The
Court found that a zoning ordinance is invalid when it is "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." 44 Such a test is by its very defi-
nition elastic and thus allows for restrictions on uses of property to be
amended as necessary. However, the purpose of the amending ordinance
must always bear a reasonable relationship to the public good as vested in
the police power - the underlying rationale of zoning.
The concept of rezoning so as to benefit the public welfare is a nebu-
lous one which can best be demonstrated by case examples. In Virginia it
has been held that the denial of a rezoning request in order to forestall
business competition bore no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare and was, therefore, improper.4 5 Likewise,
an attempt to control the manner in which a landowner is compensated
for the use of his land has been held to be beyond the underlying pur-
poses of zoning and, therefore, arbitrary and capricious.46 It is similarly
improper for a zoning ordinance to be used to encourage low income
housing.47 While aesthetic considerations may be a factor in the adoption
of a zoning ordinance, they alone will not justify restricting the use of the
property.48 Promotion of some private interest over that of the entire
community will be struck down as illegal "spot zoning.' 49
Another means of demonstrating that a zoning action is not in the pub-
lic interest and hence beyond the police power is to show that it operates
primarily for the purposes of exclusion. While a balanced community may
43. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. Id. at 395.
45. Board of Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958).
46. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Columbia Pike Ltd., 213 Va. 437, 192 S.E.2d 778 (1972).
47. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
48. Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975); Kenyon Peck, Inc.
v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria,
169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658, rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 781
(1937). See Note, Virginia Defines Scope of Local Power to Impose Dedication and Land
Use Requirements Upon Individual Landowners - Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 10 U.
RIcH. L. REv. 440 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 157 S.E.2d 920 (1967). Spot zoning/rezon-
ing was defined as an act of a zoning commission or legislative body which permits uses in
any given area of a locality which are diametrically opposed on a permanent basis to the
uses zoned or planned around it to the detriment of harmonious development, thus not
within the police powers test. Id. at 402 n.2, 157 S.E.2d at 923 n.2.
[Vol. 15:423428
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Pe a valid zoning goal, the governing body's action to achieve balance can-
not be for the purpose of excluding future burdens, economic or other-
wise, on administration of public services.50 In Board of Supervisors v.
Allman,51 the board's denial of a rezoning request primarily because of its
timing was held to be inconsistent and discriminatory and, therefore, ar-
bitrary and capricious. The court found the evidence indicated that the
denial was intended to discourage higher density uses in one end of the
county until after the development of a more favored segment of the
county.52 Similarly, in an earlier case, an action by the same Board of
Supervisors was held to be exclusionary when the Board enacted a zoning
amendment which channeled all of the development into one end of the
county by requiring a minimum of two acres per lot on the other side of
the county.53 The court found the practical effect of the amendment was
"to prevent people in the low income bracket from living in the.., area
.... ,"" Such an intentional and exclusionary purpose was found to bear
no relation to the health, safety, morals or prosperity and general welfare
of the area.55
Since a locality's police power is derived from statute, rezoning which is
in conflict with a statute is necessarily beyond the locality's police powers.
Thus in a jurisdiction in which zoning is required by statute to conform
with the master or comprehensive land use plan of the locality, rezoning
in conflict with the plan would be invalid.56 While such a requirement has
been recommended,57 Virginia has no such rule. In Virginia "a compre-
hensive or master plan does not have the status of a zoning ordinance. It
is advisory only and serves as a guide to a zoning body."'58
An equitable argument exists which operates as an exception to the
municipality's police powers. A landowner may resist a zoning amend-
50. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 322. See Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200
Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). See generally Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning Prac-
tices, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 646 (1976).
51. 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975).
52. Id. at 440-41, 211 S.E.2d at 52.
53. Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
54. Id. at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
55. Id.
56. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 322. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235
N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968). See generally, Haar, "In Accordance With a Compre-
hensive Plan," 68 HmAv. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
57. See Comment, Zoning, Planning and the Scope of Judicial Review in Virginia, supra
note 1, at 530 (1976).
58. Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 441, 211 S.E.2d 48, 52, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 490 (1975). See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-446.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980) ("The comprehensive
plan shall be made with the purpose of guiding. . . .") (emphasis added).
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ment by asserting that he has vested rights to the present zoning of his
land. In order to acquire vested rights in a certain zoning classification a
property owner must in good faith incur substantial obligations in reli-
ance on the present zoning. 59 Good faith actions in reliance mean obliga-
tions incurred with relation to the property before the property owner
learns of a pending zoning change.60 What is substantial reliance will vary
with the jurisdiction. In Virginia it has been held that
where ... a special use permit has been granted under a zoning classifica-
tion, a bona fide site plan has thereafter been filed and diligently pursued,
and substantial expense has been incurred in good faith before a change in
zoning, the permittee then has a vested right to the land use described in
the use permit and he cannot be deprived of such use by subsequent
legislation.61
Only the property owner may benefit from the vested rights theory. It
is not applicable to third parties. The court has stated "while the views of
persons owning neighboring property should be considered, property
owners have no vested right to continuity of zoning of the general area in
which they reside, and the mere purchase of land does not create a right
to rely on existing zoning. ' ' e
B. Constitutional Theories
Violation of the right to due process of law will render a zoning ordi-
nance invalid. In fact, it has been suggested that the best place to begin
any zoning challenge is at the procedural due process level.6 3 As an exam-
ple, recall that the local governing body is required by statute to refer all
zoning ordinances to the planning commission for their recommenda-
tions." Failure to follow this procedural step will void any ordinance or
59. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 322-23, 323. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-492
(Cum. Supp. 1980) ("Nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize the impairment
of any vested right....").
60. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 323. See Board of Supervisors v. Medical Struc-
tures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972).
61. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358, 192 S.E.2d 799, 801
(1972) ($59,600 in engineering fees held substantial expense in reliance). Accord, Board of
Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972). Note, however, that
under Code § 15.1-492 a vested right to a use not in conformance with zoning may be con-
tinued only so long as that use, or a more restricted one continues, and that use is not
discontinued for more than two years. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-492 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
62. Vienna Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 244 S.E.2d 542, 547-48 (1978).
63. Prichard, The Fundamentals of Zoning Law, 46 VA. L. R.v. 362, 367 (1960).
64. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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amendment.6 5 Failure to hold a public hearing on the adoption of an ordi-
nance, or providing for a greater use than was advertised in the public
notice are other examples of procedural flaw. . . which will void a zoning
amendment.6
A landowner may set aside a zoning amendment which deprives him of
substantive due process, that is one which operates as a confiscation of
his property without just compensation.17 Although zoning by its very na-
ture deprives a landowner of some of the uses of his land, some degree of
restriction is constitutionally tolerable because it is for the greater public
good and, therefore, within the police power test. 8 However, when the
discretion of the landowner as to the use of his land is so restricted that
he is deprived of all beneficial use of his property because the zoning pre-
cludes all its practical uses, the zoning ordinance "is invalid as to that
property."6 9 Thus, it has been held that zoning land for single-family resi-
dences is confiscatory and, therefore, illegal where it is practically impos-
sible to use the land in question for such residences."0
Rezoning may also be challenged as a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. This constitutional argument has
been most successfully employed to invalidate zoning ordinances when it
was coupled with the exclusionary purposes argument noted previously.71
In Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,7 2 the court held that an ordinance
which excluded a large number of otherwise legitimate retail businesses
from a retail business district denied equal protection and constituted a
taking of property without due process.7 3 Evidence was introduced which
demonstrated that the ordinance prohibited construction on about
twenty-nine percent of the land in the business zone. Land values in the
business zone dropped from $2.69 per square foot to $1.50 per square foot
65. See Standard Oil Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. -1930); National
Realty Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach, 209 Va. 172, 163 S.E.2d 154 (1968).
66. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Ciaffone v. Community Shopping
Corp., 195 Va. 41, 77 S.E.2d 817 (1953) (public hearing need not forecast the precise action
of the board).
67. Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975); Boggs v. Board of
Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971); County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44
S.E.2d 9 (1947). See VA. CONsT. art. 1 § 11.
68. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
69. Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 491, 178 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1971).
70. Id.
71. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 327. See generally Challenging Exclusionary
Zoning Practices, supra note 50. See also note 49 supra and accompanying text.
72. 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
73. Id. at 144, 216 S.E.2d at 212.
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while the value of neighboring properties remained constant.7 4 The court
held that where a land use permitted to one landowner is restricted to
another similarly situated, the restriction is prima facie discriminatory.
Since the ordinance could not be justified as a legitimate exercise of po-
lice power, it constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws.7 5
A potential constitutional challenge to a zoning amendment is that it
violates the right to travel within and among the states.76 Although this
privilege is not expressly provided for in the United States Constitution,
there is authority to support the proposition that the right to travel is
constitutionally protected.7 7 Therefore, when a zoning action precludes
the entrance of many people who would otherwise migrate, the zoning
measure may impinge upon the right to travel. Although Virginia has
never explicitly recognized this argument, it is necessarily interwoven
with the police power objections previously discussed. Similarly, since the
restriction of the right to travel would have exclusionary effects, this ar-
gument may be incorporated with those of violation of equal protection
and discrimination.
7 8
V. SCOPE OF JuDIcIL REVIEW
When the validity of a zoning amendment is challenged, each case will
74. Id. at 141, 216 S.E.2d at 210.
75. Id. at 144, 216 S.E.2d at 212. See also Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49,
216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
76. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 329. See also Challenging Exclusionary Zoning
Practices, supra note 50, at 653.
77. Challenging Exclusionary Zoning Practices, supra note 50, at 654. One interpretation
is that the right to travel is so fundamental it needed no express articulation and is implic-
itly recognized under the ninth amendment. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 330.
Another interpretation of this right was espoused in a brief for appellant by Samuel Slaff in
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), a case in which the state alleged that its police
power provided authority to restrict the travel of indigents into the state.
Freedom of movement and of residence must be a fundamental right in a democratic
State. Whether within the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or within the term liberty in the due process clause, it is a basic con-
stitutional right, the more valuable to those who migrate because of economic
compulsions.
Id. at 163. While the scope of Edwards seems to encompass interstate travel only, it is the
opinion of many commentators that the right to intrastate travel is an implicit fundamental
right as well. Challenging Exclusionary Zoning Practices, supra note 50, at 654-57.
78. See generally Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 661, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396
(1959). While the right-to-travel argument was not expressed, its recognition appears im-
plicit in the holding that the rezoning was designed to prevent low income people from
living in the area. The rezoning was held exclusionary and, therefore, unreasonable. See also
Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
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be determined on its particular facts.79 Since zoning is an exercise of dele-
gated police power, ordinances are entitled to the rebuttable presumption
of validity traditionally granted all legislative enactments.80 There is,
however, a split of authority among the states as to whether the act of
rezoning should be characterized as legislative or quasi-judicial. 1 Virginia
appears to have adopted the legislative characterization. 82 This legislative
designation is evidenced by the Virginia Supreme Court's statement as to
the traditional allocation of the burden of proof in Board of Supervisors
v. Snell.83 The court noted that when a comprehensive zoning amend-
ment is enacted
[t]he burden of proof is on him who assails it to prove that it is clearly
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it bears no reasonable or
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
The court will not substitute its judgments for that of a legislative body,
and if the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable it must
be sustained."
The court indicated that the burden of proof may vary, however, depend-
ing upon the comprehensiveness of the rezoning ordinance challenged.
The court articulated the opinion that while a landowner is always faced
with the possibility of comprehensive rezoning and the heavy burden of
proof related to it, the landowner's burden with respect to challenging a
piecemeal downzoning85 ordinance should be lessened.86 Thus the court
79. See West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 290, 192 S.E. 881, 889,
appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658 (1937), rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 781 (1938). Accord,
Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973); Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132
W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
80. Comment, Zoning, Planning and the Scope of Judicial Review in Virginia, supra
note 1, at 523. See West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881
(1937).
81. See Comment, Zoning, Planning and the Scope of Judicial Review in Virginia, supra
note 1, at 527. See, e.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 37 Or. App. 13, 586 P.2d 351 (1978)
(zoning amendments affecting few property owners are quasi-judicial); Westbrook v. Albany
Planning Commission, 148 Ga. App. 338, 251 S.E.2d 110 (1978) (legislative); Eastside
Properties Inc. v. Dade County, 358 So. 2d 873 (Fla. App. 1978) (legislative); City of Louis-
ville v. McDonala, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971) (quasi-judicial).
82. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974); Board
of Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958). But cf. Comment, Zoning, Plan-
ning and the Scope of Judicial Review in Virginia, supra note 1, at 510-11 (suggests court's
failure to define carefully the scope of review has led to a situation in which the courts
continue to espouse the applicability of the legislative presumption while denying it in fact).
83. 214 Va. 655, 202 SE.2d 889 (1974).
84. Id. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 892 (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959)).
85. Piecemeal downzoning was defined by the court as an ordinance "initiated by the
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held that in a challenge to piecemeal downzoning the aggrieved land-
owner need only make a prima facie showing that there has been no
change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety
or welfare since enactment of the prior zoning ordinance. The burden of
going forward with evidence of mistake or fraud regarding the prior ordi-
nance or with evidence of changed circumstances then shifts to the gov-
erning body. 7 In order to carry its burden, the governing body need only
supply enough evidence to reach the point where the reasonableness of
the ordinance becomes fairly debatable.88
The Snell court noted that the rule it had adopted was similar to the
Maryland "change or mistake" rule.8 9 The court also pointed out, how-
ever, that the Virginia rule differs from the Maryland rule in two impor-
tant respects. First, the Virginia rule is limited in application to piece-
meal downzoning "such as that here involved."90 Second, the "Virginia
rule does not require the governing body to produce strong evidence, but
evidence sufficient to render the issue of reasonableness 'fairly
debatable'."'9 1
Just as the enactment of a zoning amendment is a legislative function,
so is the denial of a request for rezoning.92 The burden is on the one who
seeks rezoning to show the need for it. 93 Refusal to rezone will be upheld
by a reviewing court where no compelling need for rezoning is shown, and
where no clear demonstration has been made that the existing zoning
classification is no longer reasonable or appropriate.9 The "fairly debat-
zoning authority on its own motion; one selectively addressed to landowners' single parcel
and an adjacent parcel; and one that reduces the permissible residential density below that
recommended by a duly-adopted Master Plan." Id. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
86. Id. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
87. Id.
88. Id. Note, however, that the governing body in Snell was unable to meet this burden.
One commentator has suggested that the court has increased its level of scrutiny within the
traditional legislative presumption test. See note 80 supra. See, e.g., Town Council v.
Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542 (1978); Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 211
S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975). In both cases the governing body was unable to
meet the "fairly debatable" test. 0
89. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 659 n.1, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893
n.1 (1974). See, e.g., Burke, The Change-Mistake Rule and Zoning in Maryland, 25 AM.
U.L. REv. 631 (1976).
90. Id. (emphasis added). The court's language leaves open the question whether piece-
meal downzoning is strictly defined as in note 85 supra, or whether piecemeal downzoning
simply means anything less than comprehensive downzoning.
91. Id.
92. Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
93. Town Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978).
94. Id.
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able" test will apply.9 5
The issue may be said to be "fairly debatable" when the evidence of-
fered for support of opposing views would lead objective and reasonable
persons to reach differing conclusions.9" Such evidence must be both
quantitative and qualitative, that is to say it must be evidence which is
not only substantial, but relevant and material as well.9 7 One authority
suggests that this evidential test is best dealt with through the introduc-
tion of expert testimony designed to counter that which is expected from
the government agents involved in the rezoning process.98 Experts should
definitely be available to provide testimony that the use planned by the
landowner is more appropriate than that provided for in the zoning
change.99
Virginia courts will refrain from substituting their judgments for those
of the local legislative body.10 0 The court will remand the case to the
proper officials for a final determination rather than rewrite the zoning
ordinance.1 0'
VI. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
One who loses a judicial rezoning challenge is left with land either sub-
stantially increased in value (upzoned), or significantly decreased in value
(downzoned). At least with respect to downzoning the landowner has one
other alternative as yet unrecognized in Virginia's courts. 0 2 A downzon-
ing ordinance may so restrict the free use of a piece of property as to
95. Id.
96. Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975).
97. Id.
98. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 329. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Allman,
215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,
216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975) (evidence introduced through expert testimony).
99. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 332.
100. County Board of Fairfax v. God, 216 Va. 163, 217 S.E.2d 801, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1088 (1975); City Council v. Swart, 216 Va. 170, 217 S.E.2d 803 (1975); Boggs v. Board of
Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971).
101. Id.
102. Although inverse condemnation per se has yet to be recognized in Virginia, especially
in relation to downzoning, the case of Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 196 Va. 477, 84
S.E.2d 511 (1954) appears to be a useful precedent. It was held in Heldt that article 1 § 11
of the Virginia Constitution is self-executing and that a landowner whose property is dam-
aged by the state may enforce his constitutional right to compensation in a common-law
action. Id. at 482, 84 S.E.2d at 515. See VA. CONST. art. 1 § 11 ("the General Assembly shall
not pass any law ... whereby private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses,
without just compensation.... .") (emphasis added).
19811
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
constitute a de facto condemnation, 103 otherwise known as inverse con-
demnation. Inverse condemnation is a "taking" of private property for
public use without the invocation of the power of eminent domain.' 0'
Inverse condemnation and a motion for declaratory judgment seeking
to have a rezoning ordinance set aside as confiscatory are corollary actions
distinguished only by the remedies sought. The remedy in an action for
inverse condemnation is compensation for the decreased value of one's
land whereas the remedy in an action for declaratory judgment is having
the zoning amendment set aside.
The concept of inverse condemnation with respect to zoning seems first
to have been applied in airport cases.'10 In these cases the courts have
treated the zoning ordinances as a mere substitute for the purchase of a
flight or clearance easement.' 6 One court has noted that an important
distinction between airport zoning and more traditional height zoning is
that the airport zoning contemplates actual physical use of the airspace
by aircraft while building cases do not involve such physical use.?0
California has led the nation in expanding inverse condemnation as a
cause of action in cases involving downzoning.'08 Other jurisdictions ap-
pear to be following the trend, including, possibly, Maryland. 09 As one
source has noted, inverse condemnation appears to be an up and coming
remedy for the downzoned landowner.1 0
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the decision whether to enact initial zoning legislation is a
discretionary one to be made by the governing body of a municipality or
103. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 335.
104. Id. at 334.
105. See E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 32-6 (4th ed. 1980).
106. J. BEUScHER, R. WRIGHT & M. GfTELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAmD UsE 825
(2d ed. 1976).
107. Sneed v. Riverside County, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
108. See, e.g., Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Furey v. City of Sacramento, 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979);
HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 794, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974). But cf. Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) (inverse condemna-
tion after downzoning denied).
109. Ligon v. State, 448 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1977). See also Holloway v. City of Pipe-
stone, 269 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1978) (inverse condemnation recognized as potential cause of
action after downzoning); Dempsey v. Boys Club, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977);
Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7
(1974); Eck v. City of Bismark, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979).
110. Linowes & Delaney, supra note 24, at 337.
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county,"1 ' it seems obvious that the trend in Virginia is towards increas-
ing local governmental regulation in the guise of zoning ordinances. It,
therefore, becomes apparent that local practitioners previously unfamiliar
with zoning concepts will have to come to grips with these concepts in
order to deal with encroaching zoning ordinances. Hopefully this compila-
tion of Virginia rezoning law will serve as a useful tool in such an
endeavor.
William F. Neely
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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